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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-Juvenile Confessions in Arkansas.
State v. Rouw, 265 Ark. 797, 581 S.W.2d 313 (1979)
Alan Rouw, fourteen, was picked up for questioning by a sher-
iff's deputy as a suspect in the murder of Lisa Evans. Lisa was a
neighbor and schoolmate of Rouw's. On the way to the sheriff's
office Rouw asked the deputy if he knew who had killed Lisa. The
officer replied that he thought he knew. When Rouw asked him
how he knew who had killed Lisa, the officer replied that it was his
job to know. Rouw then stated that he had killed Lisa. The deputy
warned Rouw not to say anything more until they arrived at the
sheriff's office. At the sheriff's office, Rouw again admitted killing
Lisa.
No summons was issued for Alan Rouw and his parents were
told only that their son was being taken into protective custody.
Rouw was not told of his right to remain silent or his right to have
counsel present until the following day at eleven a.m. At that time
he again confessed to the murder.1
Rouw was tried in the Juvenile Court of Carroll County and
adjudged a delinquent. Appeal was made to the Carroll County
Circuit Court and the judgment was dismissed.' He was retried in
the Juvenile Court of Carroll County and again found to be a de-
linquent. A second appeal was made to the Carroll County Circuit
Court. Rouw was adjudged a delinquent as a result of the commis-
sion of manslaughter and sentenced to the Arkansas State Train-
ing School.' The Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed Rouw's con-
viction.4 The court found that the totality of the circumstances
indicated that the state had not met its burden of proving that
Rouw had voluntarily and knowingly waived his rights to remain
silent and to have counsel present. Rouw v. State, 265 Ark. 797,
581 S.W.2d 313 (1979).
In recent years the United States Supreme Court has broadly
defined the limits of the protection that the United States Consti-
tution affords juveniles. The Court has held that juveniles are enti-
1. Rouw v. State, 265 Ark. 797, 581 S.W.2d 313 (1979).
2. Id. The case was dismissed because of the state's failure to serve Rouw with a sum-
mons pursuant to ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-425 (1977).
3. Rouw v. State, 265 Ark. 797, 798, 581 S.W.2d 313, 314 (1979).
4. Id. at 804, 581 S.W.2d at 317.
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tled to the rudiments of due process but are not entitled to the
same stringent due process rules that govern adult adjudication. It
is the Court's opinion that juveniles are benefitted by expeditious,
intimate, and informal proceedings that do not subject juveniles to
the trauma and stigma of adult proceedings."
The cornerstone of due process for both adults and juveniles is
the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution. It guaran-
tees that no person shall be compelled in a criminal case to be a
witness against himself.7 At common law there existed a rule of
evidence which barred confessions obtained by threats or
promises.8 American courts followed the rules and used the "total-
5. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). The defendant was a fifteen-year-old boy committed
to the Arizona State Industrial School for the duration of his minority after being found
guilty of making an obscene telephone call. His parents were given oral notice of their son's
detention after he was taken into custody, but no petition was served to the boy or his
parents. Gault was questioned without being told of his right to counsel or his right to
remain silent. There was no complainant present at the hearing and there was no sworn
testimony given. After Gault was convicted, his parents filed a petition for habeas corpus on
the grounds that the Arizona Juvenile Code violated due process because of the lack of a
requirement that a juvenile be served with a petition. After denial of the writ, Gault ap-
pealed. The United States Supreme Court reversed his conviction. The Court held that ju-
venile proceedings which may lead to loss of freedom must measure up to those essentials of
due process and fair treatment provided for adults. Because due process requires proper
notice of charges, the right to counsel, the right against self-incrimination, and the right of
confrontation, the Court held that Gault's conviction must be reversed.
6. McKeiver v. Pa., 403 U.S. 528, 545-60 (1971). The Supreme Court determined in
McKeiver that minors are not constitutionally guaranteed a trial by jury. Id. at 545. The
Court held in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970) that the standard of proof in juvenile
proceedings is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. For a more detailed discussion see S. M.
DAVIs, RIGHTS O JUvwus: THE JUVENMLE JusTIcE SYSTEM (1974).
7. "No person .. .shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself...." U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. This privilege was held applicable to state actions in
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) via the fourteenth amendment.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdic-
tion thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside.
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or im-
munities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
The first eight amendments to the United States Constitution were originally construed as
limitations only on the power of the federal government. The fourteenth amendment,
through the due process and equal protection clauses, makes many of the rights guaranteed
by the Bill of Rights applicable to the states. This incorporation of rights from the Bill of
Rights is known as selective incorporation. "[P]rinciple[s] of justice so rooted in the tradi-
tions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental" will be incorporated.
Snyder v. Mass., 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
8. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
9. The purpose of the rule was to ensure the reliability of confessions, to deter im-
ity of the circumstances" test'0 to determine whether a confession
was voluntary or was the product of coercion by law enforcement
officials." In 1914, Arkansas adopted the "totality of the circum-
stances" test for confessions." During the 1960's the United States
Supreme Court handed down rules that made the standard for ad-
missible confessions more definite. The most far reaching of these
decisions was Miranda v. Arizona.'s Miranda held that, in order
for any confession obtained during interrogation to be admissible
into evidence, the state must inform the suspect before questioning
of his right to remain silent, to have counsel present, and to have
counsel appointed if he is indigent. 4
The United States Supreme Court has never expressly held
that Miranda's exclusionary rule applies to a juvenile taken into
custody.' 5 However, In re Gault 6 held that where juvenile pro-
ceedings might result in a loss of liberty, the privilege against self-
incrimination applies just as it does to adult proceedings. 7 The
Court stated that the presence of counsel was necessary to preserve
that right, to help the accused recognize problems of law, to guard
against improper procedure, and to raise appropriate defenses.'"
In Rouw v. State' the Arkansas Supreme Court overturned
the conviction of Rouw, a juvenile, because the state had not met
its burden of proving that Rouw had voluntarily waived his consti-
tutional right to silence and counsel in accordance with Miranda v.
Arizona.' Critical considerations cited by Justice Darrell Hickman
proper police practices, and to ensure that confessions were not made when the free will of
the accused was impaired. Miranda v. Ariz., 384 U.S. 436, 466 (1967).
10. Haynes v. Wash., 373 U.S. 503, 513 (1963).
11. The factors considered in determining voluntariness from the totality of the cir-
cumstances were: (1) the length of the interrogation; (2) the use of threats or abuse; (3) the
length of time the suspect was held incommunicado; and (4) the characteristics of the sus-
pect, such as age. Gallegos v. Colo., 370 U.S. 49, 52-53 (1962). Other considerations were the
health of the suspect (Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1956)) and whether the suspect was
advised of his rights to remain silent and have legal counsel (Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 414
(1963)).
12. Dewein v. State, 114 Ark. 472, 170 S.W. 582 (1914).
13. 384 U.S. 436. Preceding Miranda was Escobedo v. Ill., 378 U.S. 478 (1964). In
Escobedo, the Supreme Court held that once an investigation begins to focus on a particular
suspect who is in custody, he must be advised of his right to counsel. Id. at 490-91.
14. Miranda v. Ariz., 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966).
15. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 717 (1979).
16. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
17. Id. at 55.
18. Id. at 36.
19. 265 Ark. 797, 581 S.W.2d 313 (1979).
20. Id. at 804, 581 S.W.2d at 317.
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were Rouw's age, the three day period over which the questioning
took place, the fact that Rouw's parents were told while Rouw was
in jail that he was only in protective custody, and that none of the
provisions of the Arkansas Juvenile Code regarding arrests were
followed. 1 The court held that the failure by the law enforcement
officials to follow the Juvenile Code is not grounds, alone, for auto-
matic reversal, but is a factor to be considered in determining
voluntariness."
Justice Fogleman, joined by Justices Smith and Byrd, argued
in dissent that by finding Rouw's confession to be coerced, the
court distorted the Miranda rule so that it barred what in fact was
a voluntary confession. The dissent reasoned that because Rouw
initiated the discussion of who had killed Lisa, and since the police
conduct was not of the type the Miranda rule sought to deter, the
rule was misapplied . 8 Further, Justice Fogleman stated that it was
this type of over-extension of the exclusionary rule that the public
anticipated with fear when Miranda was decided.'
When determining the voluntariness of waivers prior to Rouw
v. State, the court had refused to apply Miranda as broadly as
they did in Rouw.25 Rouw v. State is significant because the court
21. Id. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-418, -421, and -425, provide in pertinent part that when
a juvenile is arrested he shall immediately be taken before the juvenile court, that he has a
right to bond, and that he shall be notified by summons of the charges against him. Pursu-
ant to the United States Supreme Court's decision in In re Gault the Arkansas Juvenile
Justice Institute drafted a revision of the Arkansas Juvenile Court Act of 1911. It was signed
into law as Act 451 of 1975 and became effective on July 1, 1975. G. PASVOGEL,. ARKANSAS
JuvaNmE LAw AND PRoca:uRE 7 (1976). The primary purpose and philosophy of the Act was
"[t]hat the care, custody, and discipline of juveniles shall approximate as nearly as possible
that which should be given them by their parents." 1975 Ark. Acts 451. (Codified in ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 45-402 (1977)).
22. Rouw v. State, 265 Ark. 797, 800, 581 S.W.2d 313, 315-16 (1979).
23. Id. at 806, 581 S.W.2d at 318. The Miranda rule is not intended to bar confessions
given voluntarily in the absence of interrogation. Miranda v. Ariz., 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966).
Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) explained that Miranda applies only to question-
ing initiated by law enforcement officers.
24. Rouw v. State, 265 Ark. 797, 806, 581 S.W.2d 313, 318 (1979).
25. In Tucker v. State, 261 Ark. 505, 549 S.W.2d 285 (1977), a sixteen-year-old was
tried as an adult and convicted of killing his mother. He claimed that he had found her at
home, dead, at midnight and called the police. The police came and were at the house with
the boy until four a.m. Tucker was then taken to jail. After being questioned for one hour,
he confessed at seven a.m. Tucker had been in trouble before and was familiar with the
waiver of rights. His confession was upheld, although he was said to be sleepless, uncounsel-
led, and distraught when he confessed.
Justices Fogleman and Holt dissented, finding the confession involuntary after viewing
the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 521, 549 S.W.2d at 293.
In Loomis v. State, 261 Ark. 803, 551 S.W.2d 546 (1977), the accused, an adult, was told
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announced a policy of closer scrutiny of waivers by juveniles of
constitutionally-prompted rights. Although the court stated that
youth is only one factor to be considered, the decision indicates
that Rouw's age was a paramount factor since Rouw readily con-
fessed before questioning began.
In Rouw the Arkansas Supreme Court seemed to anticipate
the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Fare v.
Michael C.,27 which was decided after Rouw. Both the Arkansas
Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court held that
the "totality of the circumstances" test was the proper one for ju-
venile adjudications." The circumstances considered by both
several times that he could have a lawyer. He said that he thought he needed one and also
that he thought he needed to see a psychiatrist. He then became indecisive and asked the
prosecutor if he thought that he (Loomis) should have a lawyer. The prosecutor started to
leave but Loomis called him back and asked where he was going. The prosecutor answered
that he was going to get Loomis a lawyer, and Loomis said that he did not want the prosecu-
tor to leave. The Arkansas Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Fogleman, held
that there "could hardly have been a more thorough waiver." Id. at 812, 551 S.W.2d at 551.
Justices Smith and Byrd dissented, stating that all questioning should have stopped when
Loomis first said that he thought he needed a lawyer. Id. at 813, 551 S.W.2d at 552.
In Hammond v. State, 244 Ark. 1113, 428 S.W.2d 639 (1968), the accused, an adult, was
arrested and told by the sheriff that he would rather Hammond not say anything. Ham-
mond was put into a police car. On the way to the sheriff's office Hammond indicated that
he wanted to talk. The sheriff again said that he did not want to talk about it. Hammond
confessed at the sheriff's office when they were searching him shortly after arrival. The Ar-
kansas Supreme Court upheld the confession stating that although there was no evidence
that a Miranda warning was given, there was sufficient evidence that Hammond's state-
ments were voluntary. Id. at 1123, 48 S.W.2d at 645.
26. Rouw v. State, 265 Ark. 797, 799, 581 S.W.2d 313, 315 (1979).
27. In Fare v. Michael C., 21 Cal. 3d 471, 579 P.2d 7, 146 Cal. Rptr. 358 (1978), the
California Supreme Court held that a juvenile's request to see his probation officer before
being questioned amounted to a per se invocation of his right to silence. Michael C. was a
sixteen-year-old who was implicated in murder. He was given the Miranda warning at the
station house before being questioned. The accused asked to see his probation officer and
was refused. He then agreed to answer questions and confessed after interrogation. The
California Supreme Court reversed the conviction and stated that a probation officer, al-
though a peace officer, was in a position to be trusted by a juvenile and that, statutorily, he
should represent his charge's interest to an extent. Consequently, the court found that a
probation officer could protect a minor's fifth amendment rights in the same manner as an
attorney.
In Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 723-24 (1979), the United States Supreme Court
ruled that the California Supreme Court had overextended Miranda, and that a request to
see a probation officer by an accused is only a factor to be considered in determining
whether a juvenile's confession is voluntary. The court further stated that the "per se aspect
of Miranda was thus based on the unique role the lawyer plays in the adversary system
.... " and that "[a] probation officer is not in the same posture. .. " because he is a state
employee, bound to seek the interest of the state. Id. at 719.
28. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724 (1979). Rouw v. State, 265 Ark. 797, 803, 581
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courts were the age of the accused, 9 whether the Miranda warning
was given and understood, 0 and the length of the interrogation. 1
Although the courts reached different results because of the differ-
ent facts, the cases reaffirm the vitality of the "totality of the cir-
cumstances" test in determining the voluntariness of a juvenile
confession.
Ann Kristen Kilgore
S.W.2d 313, 317 (1979).
29. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979). Rouw v. State, 265 Ark. 797, 799, 581
S.W.2d 313, 315 (1979).
30. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979). Rouw v. State, 265 Ark. 797, 803, 581
S.W.2d 313, 317 (1979).
31. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979). Rouw v. State, 265 Ark. 797, 800, 581
S.W.2d 313, 315 (1979).
512 [Vol. 3:507
